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Abstract 
People have preferences for how their social environment is organized and governed.  One 
influential explanation of variation in these preferences focuses on individual differences in 
sensitivity to threats.  Recent research demonstrates that this relationship is not only a function 
of the degree of sensitivity (greater or lesser), but also of the danger in question (i.e., 
immigration or climate change) and the kind of potential harm it poses (i.e., physical pain or 
contamination).  Since many political issues are not unambiguously of one kind, the structure of 
an individual’s reactions to perceived political threats is also uncertain.  We argue that future 
research should (i) use functional neuroimaging to test these structures and (ii) investigate the 
role of social learning in their transmission. 
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Introduction 
People have preferences for how their social environment is organized and governed. These 
preferences differ between individuals, and can persist within individuals over decades, e.g., 
[1].  For example, some people prefer to prioritize communal order over personal independence 
[2].  Similarly, some people prefer to prioritize feelings of security over novelty [3].  The overall 
structure of people’s preferences for social and political organization is often called an 
ideological orientation (for a discussion, see [4]).  
 
What is the origin and proximal mechanism of these preferences? Specifically, how do people 
from the same society, and even the same family, come to have different preferences for social 
organization and government?  
  
One influential hypothesis has been that ideological orientations may derive from prior 
differences in people’s sensitivity to danger. That is, people may have predispositions to react 
more or less vigorously in dangerous situations. People who experience strong aversion would 
come to perceive the external world as more threatening. This sensitivity might then lead people 
to prefer to invest in defending society and the social order against threats. Across multiple 
measures, people with conservative or right-wing ideological orientations appear to be more 
sensitive to danger [5]. 
  
Although this model has generated many useful observations, it is oversimplified in at least two 
ways. First, people do not perceive only “greater” and “lesser” threats, but threats of qualitatively 
different kinds. Threats of physical harm versus contamination evoke different proximate 
psychological and neural reactions, within a single individual. Differences between individuals in 
political threat perceptions could thus arise from more than one proximate mechanism. Second, 
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most political issues are not unambiguously and intrinsically defined by a specific kind of threat. 
Complex issues, like climate change or immigration, can be perceived as posing more than one 
kind of threat.  For example, some are more concerned with immigration as a threat to cultural 
purity while others worry more about the possibility that immigrants are violent criminals or 
terrorists [6].  Similarly, climate change is thought of as an existential risk, but also as a purity 
violation [7].  Interpersonal and intergenerational transmission of political preferences must 
therefore involve not only heritable predispositions, but also transfer of conceptual 
representations.   
 
In this article, we sketch how future research should (i) use functional neuroimaging to test the 
structure, both within and across individuals, of people’s reactions to perceived threats, and (ii) 
directly test the role of social learning in the transmission of these reactions across 
people.  Taken together, these two research programs will more precisely specify the 
relationship between threat perception and political preferences, and provide a better 
understanding of the causal mechanisms at work.  
 
Ideological orientation and danger 
Broadly construed, an individual’s ideological orientation consists of the bundle of attitudes and 
preferences for how the social and political world should be organized (and the way in which 
that organization should be achieved) [4].  This orientation is often expressed in one dimension 
(left-right or liberal-conservative) or two dimensions (social and economic), though there are 
other formulations and proxies, such as Social Dominance Orientation [8], and Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism [9].   
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Using these classic measures, conservatives perceive more physical dangers to society and to 
themselves (e.g., more fear of terrorism) than liberals (for a recent meta-analysis of this 
relationship, see [5]).  When concern for physical bodily harm is mitigated, conservative 
individuals can become (presumably, briefly) slightly more liberal [10].  In addition, compared to 
liberals, conservatives are more sensitive to threats of contamination, report feeling more 
disgusted on standard measures [11] and avoid attending to disgusting stimuli [12].  
 
Political psychologists have debated which of these kinds of sensitivity offers a better 
explanation of individual differences in ideological orientation - fear of violent harm or disgust 
sensitivity - or whether both are expressions of a single underlying trait (i.e., negativity bias) 
(see the exchange between [13], [14], and [15]).    
 
However, neuroimaging experiments suggest that fear in response to threat of physical harm, 
and disgust in response to threat of contamination, arise from at least partially distinguishable 
psychological and neural mechanisms within individuals [16–18].  Thus it is plausible that both 
kinds of responses vary across individuals, because they originate in separable neural systems. 
Indeed, some research already suggests that individual differences in fear and disgust are only 
moderately correlated (e.g., [19,20]).  
 
Also, although conservatives frequently seem to be more sensitive to both fear- and disgust-
eliciting stimuli than liberals, this pattern may actually be a consequence of the chosen elicitors. 
Many such studies measure responses to a limited set of threats (e.g. terrorism for physical 
harm, sexual behaviours for contamination). It may be that liberals have equally strong aversive 
reactions to threats, but in response to different elicitors. For example, liberals may strongly fear 
the physical harm that may come from climate change, or feel disgust at corporate 
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greed.  Broader question batteries demonstrate that there are threats that concern both liberals 
and conservatives (e.g., government corruption) and threats that concern one group more than 
the other (e.g., environmental pollution) [21–23*].  Heightening the salience of liberal concerns 
can (presumably briefly) shift political orientation to the left [24*], just as heightening the 
salience of terrorism can shift political orientation to the right [25].  Similarly, the strength of 
association between conservatism and disgust sensitivity is determined by the specific elicitors 
included in the study [26*].  Across five studies of German and American adults, the relationship 
between disgust and conservatism could be positive (as for homosexuality), negative (for 
environmental pollution), or null (for rotting meat); further, non-specific disgust sensitivity (no 
elicitors) was unrelated to conservatism.   
 
Are these parallel concerns of liberals and conservatives really instances of the same 
states?  How could we test whether the emotional reactions that liberals call “fear of climate 
change” are meaningfully similar to those conservatives call “fear of terrorism”?  Or, 
analogously, that what liberals call disgust at corporate greed is meaningfully similar to what 
conservatives call disgust at promiscuity? 
 
These questions require methods that can distinguish between states within an individual (e.g., 
fear versus disgust within conservatives), and directly measure the similarity of states, between 
individuals (e.g., fear in liberals versus fear in conservatives). For both these purposes, we 
recommend that future studies use neuroimaging.  
 
Defining the relationship 
Reactions to perceived danger have long been a topic of study in neuroscience.  Foundational 
neuroimaging research in humans focused on mapping brain regions that were, on average, 
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more active when subjects were exposed to threatening as opposed to neutral stimuli (for 
example reviews, see [27,28]).  In the political domain, this type of mapping exercise contributed 
confirmatory evidence for existing models, including those focused on threat perception (for a 
review, see [29]).   
 
Recently, more nuanced patterns of brain activation, neural representations, have become the 
focus of research.  A neural representation refers to a pattern of brain activity “that serves the 
purpose of conveying information that specifies perceptions, thoughts, or any other mental 
content” and contributes to behavior [30].  For our purposes, it is important to note that this shift 
towards focusing on representations was facilitated by innovations in the analytic techniques 
deployed with neuroimaging data [31,32].  In particular, we want to highlight the use of multi-
voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) for classification and for representational similarity analysis 
(RSA).  What distinguishes MVPA techniques from approaches that focus on average activation 
across brain regions is that they can take advantage of the neural information contained in 
smaller units of spatial resolution (e.g., voxels).  
 
Pattern classification 
Classification methods use machine learning tools to quantify how separable patterns of neural 
activity are from one another.  Classifiers have been used to distinguish the neural 
representations of the concepts of ingroup and outgroup [33], directly threatening versus neutral 
stimuli [34,35], and threat-related emotional responses from one another, such as fear versus 
disgust (e.g., [36]).  For comprehensive reviews, see [16,17].  Emotional intensity has also been 
successfully classified and distinguished from the experience of pain [37]. 
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Pattern classification could be used to test a number of basic questions about the proximal 
basis of ideological orientation.  A plausible definition of threat sensitivity is how accurately we 
can classify threatening from non-threatening stimuli, based on patterns of neural responses 
within an individual. Thus, if we expect a positive relationship between threat sensitivity and 
conservatism, we can ask: are threatening versus non-threatening stimuli classified more 
accurately from neural responses in conservative versus liberal individuals?  If this sensitivity 
extends to the acuteness with which individuals experience the threat-relevant emotions of fear 
and disgust, we can also ask: are individual differences in classification accuracy for threats of 
physical harm, and/or for threats of contamination, correlated with ideological orientation?  We 
can also explore the question of comparable threat perception across the ideological spectrum: 
can a classifier trained on types of non-political threats (e.g. snakes, rotting meat) be used to 
classify neural representations of political or interpersonal threats?  Do the accurately classified 
targets vary according to ideological orientation? If liberals fear climate change in the same way 
that conservatives fear terrorism, then a classifier trained to identify neural representations of 
fear should be equally accurate in classifying neural representations in liberals and 
conservatives, but for different elicitors.  
 
Representational similarity 
Representational similarity methods use measures of relatedness (e.g., distance, correlation) to 
characterize how close patterns of neural response are to one another in high-dimensional 
spaces (see [38] for a discussion of these techniques and [39] for a synthesis of the 
mathematics involved in modeling neural representations).  RSA has been used to compare the 
neural representations of learned fear and pre-existing fear [40**] and to characterize complex 
social constructs, such as stereotypes [41]. 
 
Authors’ Accepted Manuscript 
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 34 (2020), pp. 58-63 
 
 
9 
 
RSA could be used to answer several questions about how individuals vary in their neural 
representations of politically-relevant stimuli.  We argue that these types of stimuli (e.g., prompts 
to consider interacting with an immigrant or the consequences of climate change) could evoke a 
number of different representations.  We can directly measure this heterogeneity by asking:  
within each individual, how similar are representations of politically-relevant stimuli to non-
political fear- and disgust-elicitors (e.g., snakes)?  Across individuals, do representations of the 
same stimulus cluster with different non-political elicitors?  Are these clusters related to 
ideological orientation?  We can also ask more broadly what might be missing in our 
understanding of politically-relevant threat representations: are there other shared components 
of threat representations (beyond fear- and disgust-elicitation) that explain their relatedness 
(e.g., self-relevance, stakes)?  These types of exploratory analysis could be used to more fully 
characterize how politically-relevant stimuli are represented in the brain. 
 
In summary, neuroimaging offers a means by which individual-level differences (and group-level 
averages) in how potential threats are perceived can be measured and characterized.  While 
prior research has investigated the indirect relationship between neural response to non-political 
threats and political orientation (e.g., [42]), we propose directly measuring and characterizing 
the neural representations of the targets of interest.  The goal of this research would be to 
identify the specific threat perceptions that underlie political preferences in individuals and in 
groups.  
 
Origin stories 
Characterizing the relationship between specific threat perceptions and political preferences in 
adults leaves open a critical question about the causal origin of these perceptions.  How do 
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people acquire the specific threat perceptions that underlie political preferences? How do 
different political issues become associated with the “same” threat perceptions?  
 
One possibility is that organisms “know” certain dangers when they are first encountered, i.e. 
they are innate at some level.  Even very young infants preferentially attend to stimuli 
associated with fear in adults (e.g., snakes and spiders, heights, strangers); however, this bias 
in attention is only accompanied by negative affect under certain circumstances and so is not 
equivalent to fearfulness [43**].  Negative responses to social threatening stimuli (e.g., faces) 
appear earlier in development than responses to threatening non-social (animal) stimuli, though 
both would be harmful to the very young [44].   Sensitivity to different types of disgust-inducing 
threats also emerges over early childhood, and is largely absent when infants and toddlers are 
most vulnerable to infection and disease. Feeling disgusted by other people (as opposed to 
bodily fluids or animals) appears particularly late, around 7 years of age [45].  
 
Thus, associations between stimuli and states are not necessarily instantiated at the first 
encounter. Infants encounter animals without automatically becoming afraid of them; children 
similarly encounter individuals and items that engender disgust responses later in life without 
being disgusted by them. This sequence suggests a role for learning.   
 
The dangerousness of a stimulus can be learned in a number of ways, including direct personal 
experience, social observation, and social instruction (for a review of these models, see 
[46,47]).  Learning through social observation occurs when one individual watches another have 
a personal experience (e.g., eating a poisonous berry and becoming ill), also called vicarious 
learning.  Learning through social instruction occurs when one individual communicates 
information deliberately, often explicitly (e.g., warning that eating the berry will result in 
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illness).  All three forms of learning can lead to a neutral stimulus being represented as a threat, 
whether or not that representation is objectively justified [48].  For example, children can learn to 
morally condemn arbitrary novel actions [49] and learn to form demeaning associations with 
novel outgroups [50] after adults voice judgments.  Adults also willingly transmit threat-relevant 
information to one another, even when there is a low probability of harm, and a high probability 
of a positive outcome [51*]. Moreover, learned threat representations do not necessarily update 
when the environment changes and greater advantage would be accrued by treating the 
stimulus as non-threatening [52].  That is, they are not easily unlearned.  
 
Developmental research approaches 
To investigate how specific threat perceptions are acquired, we can use research approaches 
from developmental psychology. For example, we can ask how threat perceptions are 
transmitted from parents to children. Children’s attitudes towards social groups are correlated 
with their parents’ political attitudes [53]. Similarity between parents and children, for example in 
overall fearfulness, is partly explained by shared genes, but the family environment is also 
important [54,55].  Parents transmit values in subtle ways: for example, parents express similar 
admonitions using different prosody, in response to moral (harming others) versus pragmatic 
(creating inconvenience) transgressions [56].  In another example, parents’ gendered behaviors 
in the first six years of their child’s life were shown to be better predictors of their children’s 
gender-role attitudes at age six than parents’ own stated gender-role attitudes [57].  A similar 
study design could be used to understand the contributions of parental behavior, versus explicit 
parental communication, to the beliefs about those threats that develop in early childhood. This 
type of study could also be deployed to study peer-to-peer transmission of threat representation 
in older children and adolescents.   
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All of these methods measure behavior and cognition during development. However, it is also 
increasingly possible to directly measure neural representations in children [58] and adolescents 
[59] Thus, future research could investigate the initial emergence of neural representations of 
threat perception, when those representations are evoked by political issues, and what kind of 
transmission most rapidly induces or modifies these representations. 
 
In summary, developmental research methods should be used to investigate not just the 
general tendencies emerging in childhood that appear relevant for broader ideological 
orientation (e.g., trait fearfulness  [60]), but also the causal mechanism by which specific threat 
perceptions become linked to specific political preferences. 
 
Conclusion 
Ideological orientation and political preferences more generally relate in part to an individual’s 
appraisals of the dangers in the environment and how they would best be mitigated.  Here, we 
have proposed that the tools exist to integrate more proximate measures of threat perception - 
neural representations - into our understanding of the relationship between psychological 
responses to danger and political preferences.   
 
We have also argued that social learning is likely an important factor in the acquisition of threat 
representations, which are willingly and deliberately transmitted.  This process of acquiring 
threat representations may have important consequences for how we understand our political 
preferences, those that we express around the dinner table or in the voting booth. 
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